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Abstract 
W i l e  there are many agencies and 
states which actively monitor early 
warning information, few have the 
added challenge of linking their analysis 
of the information with their actions in 
thefield. This article explores the opera- 
tional reality of the International Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 
arguing that there is not a monolithic 
early warning system which will meet 
the needs of all players. 
Alors qu'un grand nombre d'agences et 
d'ttats suivent de trks pr2s la circula- 
tion des informations concernant 
lralerte prhentive, trks peu fontface au 
dt$ supplknentaire consistant d ttablir 
le lien entre les informations dont ils 
disposent et leur action sur le terrain. 
Cet article explore la rhlit t  @ation- 
nalle de la Croix Rouge Internationale 
et du Mouvement Croissant Rouge, en 
dhloppant une argumentation selon 
lquelle il n'existe pas un s y s t h e  mo- 
nolithique d'alerte prhentive qui ren- 
contrerait les besoins de la totalitt des 
i n t m n t s .  
For international organizations pro- 
viding emergency relief, an effective 
early warning system functions much 
like a living strategic plan. Information 
from the early warning system is ana- 
lyzed and operational decisions are 
taken based on this analysis. The link 
between analysis and action is often 
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made within a very short time. Other 
times, there is opportunity for pro- 
longed reflection and in these circum- 
stances one has to be vigilant in 
monitoring, careful not to miss a fluc- 
tuation in the indicators. 
For Red Cross, the main issue at 
stake with regard to "synergy in early 
warning" is how best to serve the inter- 
ests of the victims, or potential victims, 
in an effective and coherent way. Pri- 
ority attention is also paid to increas- 
ing the strength of local coping 
mechanisms. Much of the early warn- 
ing information comes from this level 
of the system and, in addition, any re- 
sponse which may be planned must be 
carried out in conjunction with struc- 
tures and capacities which are already 
present. 
Early Warning: the Red Cross 
Context 
In the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement, players come 
from one of three components: the 
National Societies, the Federation and 
the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC). A brief explanation of 
the organization of the Red Cross sys- 
tem at this point allows for a more 
detailed contextual analysis of our op- 
erations later on in the paper. 
To begin, there exist 171 National 
Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies 
around the world. Considering the 
additional "National Societies in for- 
mation," there is virtually a Red Cross 
or Red Crescent presence in almost 
every country in the world, forming a 
truly international network of assist- 
ance. The Societies must fulfil stringent 
conditions to become recognized and 
to gain membership in the Movement. 
They must carry on humanitarian 
work throughout the territory of their 
country. They must respect the seven 
Fundamental ~rinciples' of the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movement 
and be recognized by their govern- 
ments as voluntary aid societies which 
act as auxiliaries to the public authori- 
ties. Additionally, special status under 
International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL) gives National Societies and the 
ICRC a privileged role and responsi- 
bility in relation to victims of armed 
conflicts. National Societies provide a 
range of services, including emer- 
gency relief, health services and social 
assistance, to those individuals consid- 
ered most vulnerable and most in 
need. They are responsible for dissemi- 
nating information on IHL. In war- 
time, National Societies may act as 
auxiliaries to the army medical sew- 
ices, aid prisoners and refugees and 
provide a tracing service to help put 
people in touch with missing relatives. 
The International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (the 
Federation), founded in 1919, is the 
permanent liaison body of the Na- 
tional Societies. The Federation is the 
element of the Red Cross which organ- 
izes and coordinates international re- 
sponse to natural disasters and to the 
population movements (namely refu- 
gees) which result from conflict. The 
Federation further assists all National 
Societies in developing their capacity 
to effectively manage staff, volunteer 
and governance structures, as well as 
programs. 
The ICRC was created in 1863 and is 
the foundingbody of the Movement. A 
Swiss-governed institution, the ICRC 
acts to protect and assist victims of in- 
ternational and internal civil conflicts, 
and has official responsibilities set out 
in the four Geneva Conventions and 
the two Additional Protocols. Associ- 
ated tasks include the unique mandate 
of monitoring the treatment of prison- 
ers of war, and a right of humanitarian 
initiative recognized by the inter- 
national community. The ICRC is a 
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neutral, impartial and independent 
humanitarian institution. 
Both the Federation and the ICRC 
maintain a decentralized network of 
regional delegations spread out across 
the world, as well as a host of active 
country delegations. The country del- 
egations manage the territory-specific 
operations; often this includes man- 
agement of a relief operation. The re- 
gional delegations assist the cluster of 
country delegations in their jurisdic- 
tions, while also bringing a wider geo- 
graphic perspective to the operations. 
This combination of National Socie- 
ties, country delegations, regional del- 
egations and Geneva headquarters 
adds up to a Movement which, with 
staff and volunteers, directly includes 
over W),000,000 individuals. The de- 
centralized grassroots structure allows 
Red Cross to be there-con the spot- 
responding to crises effectively and 
rapidly. 
Early Warning Information is . . . 
What? For Whom? Starting 
When? 
Organizations seek early warning 
information for different reasons, 
depending on their own unique man- 
date. 
There does not exist a monolithic, 
all-encompassing Red Cross early 
warning system. As with most organi- 
zations, the various offices of the Red 
Cross seek information from many 
sources, depending on its unique 
needs. In fad the early warning termi- 
nology would, in our case, be better 
expressed as "trend" or "horizon scan- 
ning." It means accessing the type of 
information required to do our job--to 
assist beneficiaries. 
To assist us and similar organiza- 
tions, there are already many related 
early warning systems and tools. What 
they provide is raw material-infor- 
mation which can be subject to a vari- 
ety of interpretations. As an example, 
the inflation rate in an economically 
troubled country is a piece of raw data. 
Having analyzed this rate, a social 
services organization may then call for 
a fight against the associated rise in 
child poverty. A government agency 
may use the statistic as a rationale for 
budget cuts. A bank may see a neces- 
sity to raise the interest rates. A group 
representing elders may use such a sta- 
tistic to lobby for the need for an in- 
crease in pensions. 
Within the context of a complex con- 
flict, the nuances of meaning sur- 
rounding one statistic or one bit of 
information are subject to the same 
variations of perception. Added to the 
variances can be a political or ethnic 
fervour which, in and of itself, further 
skews the interpretation. 
While some data, such as inflation 
rates or information about political 
prisoners, may be released on a regular 
schedule, there are other bits of early 
monitoring. One seeks to analyze from 
a national or regional perspective, 
while the other functions at a local or 
community level. 
The macro-triggers provide data 
which monitors the humanitarian situ- 
ation from a national or international 
perspective. This includes the trends 
in national/regional politics (such as 
the monitoring of political forces, mili- 
tary presence, ethnic factors, deno- 
graphic trends); trends in the 
geopolitical context; in international 
health (i.e., the rate and transmissibil- 
ity of disease); in national/regional 
security issues; in satellite clima- 
tological/agronomica1 data, and the 
presence and operations of interna- 
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warning information which are more 
creeping in nature. It is difficult, for 
example, to quantify the extent of rac- 
ism or ethnic hatred in a region. For 
information of this nature, it is the 
choice of the individual analyst as to 
how far back one needs to go in time to 
track a situation. If the roots of a situa- 
tion, such as that of Hutus and Tutsis 
in Rwanda, goes back over genera- 
tions-when does a warning no longer 
merit being called "early"? Given the 
ethnic composition and historical trou- 
bles in many regions of the world, 
there are already welldefined param- 
eters for potential conflict. There 
would thus be little reason to call a 
warning "early," but rather "perpetual." 
For this reason, it is not realistic to 
speak of a monolithic "early warning 
system." There is a semblance of a sys- 
tem which exists, yet it exists only to 
aggregate information. 
Early Warning: Big Picture and 
Small Picture 
There are essentially two intertwined 
early warning systems which require 
tional actors (diplomatic, humanitar- 
ian, religious). 
There is an international system for 
monitoring these macro-triggers, yet 
each player seeks information related 
to their specialized mandate. These 
players include, yet are not limited to: 
the United Nations system, the Or- 
ganization for Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe (OSCE), the media, all 
individual states and their embassies, 
international organizations, NGO's 
and universities. 
Functioning at a lower level, the 
micro-triggers provide data which 
monitors the humanitarian situation 
from a local or community perspec- 
tive. Some of that which is monitored 
has previously been mentioned, yet 
the narrower perspective influences 
what one may see in the data, thus the 
interpretation may not be the same. 
Micro-triggers include, but are not lim- 
ited to, the following: 
the political situation; 
climatic conditions and food secu- 
rity/ availability/ access; 
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market prices/market background 
information; 
the activities of international 
organizations and NGO's; 
security situation; 
public health situation, including 
the state of health facilities; 
population movements; 
"at risk" populations; 
agriculture, including land prepa- 
ration trends, rainfall and germina- 
tion, crops, yield estimates; 
detainees situation; and 
human rights situation. 
A finalmicro-trigger looks at the use 
of a population's coping mechanisms 
or "insurance" policies. This could 
take many forms and includes the fol- 
lowing: 
changes in cropping and planting 
practices; 
* dispersed grazing; 
migration in search of employ- 
ment; 
increased petty commodity pro- 
duction; 
collection of wild foods; 
use of inter-household transfers 
and loans; 
use of credit from merchants and 
moneylenders; 
rationing of current food consump- 
tion or slimming; 
consumption of relief food; 
sale of productive assets; and 
break-up of household and distress 
migration. 
There are many different organiza- 
tions which monitor the micro-triggers 
and, in various ways, provide the asso- 
ciated information. These include local 
governments, religious and cultural 
groups, community and neighbour- 
hood associations, local public health 
authorities, Red Cross or Red Crescent 
Societies and many other players. 
It is important for those larger agen- 
cies which focus on the macro-perspec- 
tive to compare their national or 
international conclusions with that of 
the local perspective. Often the macro- 
indicators may paint a different pic- 
ture than that which is viewed at the 
local perspective. While there may be 
legitimate reasons for this, that level of 
comparative analysis is important to 
undertake in order to develop a corn- 
prehensive view of a situation. 
How Do We Gather and Analyze 
Information? 
The information yielded through the 
systems mentioned above is raw data. 
It does not form a single mechanism 
for early warning which can be as- 
sessed by all interested players. Thus, 
the data requires analysis and inter- 
pretation to become meaningful and 
this is a task undertaken by all indi- 
vidual players, using their own spe- 
cialized mandate as a filter. 
Using terminology of a paper pre- 
sented by William DeMars (1997)? 
who assessed the utility of data gath- 
ered by NGOs for early warning pur- 
poses, one pragmatic response is that 
the variety of NGO eyes and ears are 
attached to different heads. Where that 
head is, and what it looks like, will in- 
fluence how it gathers and interprets 
data. Is it black? White? Male? Female? 
Religious? Independent or organi- 
zationally-based? Canadian? African? 
These factors can influence what the 
eyes see, and what the ears hear. Like- 
wise, what an early warning indicator 
is and how or if you should react, de- 
pends enormously on who you ask. 
Having accessed raw data, there are 
a number of steps to take in assessing 
it. For the purpose of assessing what 
could be early warning information, 
relief organizations need to constantly 
test the validity of information gath- 
ered. To do so, they first ensure that 
those doing the data gathering are 
well-trained. Preferably there are 
multidisciplinary teams working to- 
gether. In addition, organizations 
must analyze the data gathering sys- 
tem/ trends to ensure that respondents 
are not seeking to manipulate a possi- 
ble response. 
Within the Red Cross and Red Cres- 
cent Movement, the National Societies 
engage the local population in train- 
ing, innetworking and risk analysis. In 
this way, there are local people moni- 
toring early warning indicators which 
they themselves find to be meaningful. 
Ideally, this is part of a disaster pre- 
paredness and prevention (DPP) 
p$-ogram, linking the capture of infor- 
mation to the n@ for action, given 
certain defined scenarios. 
Another element of early warning 
data analysis is that of determining the 
cause for changes to raw data. If trends 
change, how can this be explained? 
What are the repercussions or conse- 
quences of this change? In this way, the 
analyst attempts to stay a step or two 
(or three) ahead of an unfolding sce- 
nario. In the case of Red Cross, this of- 
tenbrings about the pre-positioning of 
food or medical stocks. In situations 
when troops are called to action, it can 
also bring about renewed ICRC efforts 
to train armed forces in international 
humanitarian law, ensuring that sol- 
diers understand the rules of war. 
The Importan* and Difficylty of 
Having a Neutral Approach in 
the Gatheringl of Information 
Yet the context of an increasing pro- 
portion of operations today is often 
having little to do with organized 
armed forces. New armed actors of 
violence often do not represent na- 
tions, but rather economic, ethnic, reli- 
gious interests or even organized 
crime. This growth of criminal behav- ' 
iour and banditry imposes a new ap- 
proach the context of unstructured 
conflicts where basic rules are not 
respected. It necessitates a new hori- 
zon-scanning approach for relief 
agencies, one which includes players 
mot normally reclognized as valid inter- 
locutors. 
Other trends which affect security 
of Red Cross/Red Crescent operations 
include the fact that humanitarian ac- 
tion is becornin8 increasingly attached 
to Western values and as such, are per- 
ceived to repre$ent enemies by some 
parties to a conflict. Further, humani- 
tarian action is in contradiction with 
the very aims of what are known as 
conflicts of identity or conflicts of a 
genocidal naturfe. 
Despite the vast expanse of data 
which can be gathered from the 
plethora of infomation sources today, 
it can become more and more difficult 
to have a clear picture of the hu- 
manitarian community owing to 
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interagency competition, overlapping 
mandates, militarization and politici- 
zation.   his situation is exacerdated by 
rampant mediatization which results 
in a blurred conception of each agen- 
cy's mandate and may cast doubt on 
an operation's independence and neu- 
trality. 
The media, through its field pres- 
ence and pursuit of news in time for 
deadlines and often for commercial 
purposes, comes to play a role which 
extends far beyond that of mere 
observer. This has a ripple effect for 
agencies which compete for media at- 
tention, as profiling of organizational 
logos in the international media comes 
to be equated with success for the en- 
tire operation. Additionally, the media 
pursues and distributes information 
from many of the same sources used 
by relief agencies. In being quoted as a 
media source, an agency may have 
jeopardized the extent to which it can 
subsequently collect information. This 
forces a degree of accountability from 
agency representatives and a sharp un- 
derstanding of information, as well as 
the role of disinformation. 
The data-gathering job is thus often 
not one which is, in itself, neutral. 
Particularly in the context of today's 
unstructured conflicts, there are many 
interlocutors who must be included in 
an agency's horizon-scanning. Each 
has their own agenda and seeks to pro- 
vide information which furthers this 
platform. Agencies must be diligent in 
their own collection of information, 
ensuring that all parties and sub- 
groups are consulted-aware that 
each has its own bias. 
The Link Between Information and 
Action 
As relief organizations must tie their 
analysis to their subsequent actions, 
attention is always paid to the local 
individual and group coping mecha- 
nisms. When are they being used? 
When are they being challenged? 
When are they being overwhelmed? 
This brings an organization to the 
point of then deciding when is an ap- 
propriate and necessary time to re- 
spond. 
The option of response is always 
analyzed against the strength of local 
coping mechanisms. Much like a dis- 
aster, an international response may 
challenge and/or overwhelm the local 
capacities. Possible interventions are 
assessed for the degree to which they 
would be likely to make the transition 
to longer-term development projects, 
as well as the degree to which it may 
impact the local, national or interna- 
tional political scene. 
Ideally, a response initiative is pre- 
ventive in nature, seeking to avoid 
early warning system, not all organi- 
zations are expert in monitoring an 
early warning system-nor should 
they be. A traditional development 
project must certainly understand the 
context in which it is operating yet, if it 
is a project focused on childhood im- 
munization, let us not expect it to like- 
wise provide an analysis of national 
political trends. 
The limitations of an organization's 
mandate will govern the degree to 
which it is involved in an assessment 
of early warning information, likewise 
It would be unwise to believe that every organization which has a 
hand in feeding an early warning system wiU likewise be a part of a 
response which is eventuaUy staged. While it is believed that early 
warning information should be tied to early action, it is ofen not 
appropriate for a multiplicity of agencies to be involved in this action. 
human suffering. While the prescrip- 
tive actions associated with avoiding a 
natural disaster are relatively straight- 
forward, those associated with avoid- 
ing conflict are more complex. 
It would be unwise to believe that 
every organization which has a hand 
in feeding an early warning system 
will likewise be a part of a response 
which is eventually staged. While it is 
believed that early warning informa- 
tion should be tied to early action, it is 
oftennot appropriate for a multiplicity 
of agencies to be involved in this ac- 
tion. This is particularly true in the case 
of a complex disaster. 
Within the Red Cross and Red Cres- 
cent Movement, it is the National Soci- 
ety which is the "first responder." 
Through the prepositioning of volun- 
teers trained in first aid and disaster 
preparedness and prevention, they are 
in a position to be informed about 
pending disasters and tobe at the scene 
as it unfolds. Following from this, it is 
clear that each element of the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movement 
plays its own special role in disaster 
prevention, response or mitigation. 
Likewise, each organization in- 
volved in early warning and response 
plays its own role. While all may for- 
mally or informally feed each others 
it will govern the degree to which the 
organization is involved in a response 
initiative. 
What Next? 
Ultimately, an effective early warning 
system is but one step. Receiving ap- 
propriate and accurate raw data is im- 
portant, as is the data analysis. Yet 
even if the coordination and collabora- 
tion among the various agencies were 
improved, the world may not emerge a 
safer place. 
Reiponse agencies need to continu- 
ally assess and validate their data. 
The "early" warning is timeless in 
that it represents a constant, cycli- 
cal approach to monitoring, assess- 
ing, analyzing and comparing. 
The root causes of conflicts and dis- 
asters need to be addressed. Early 
warning, followed by early hu- 
manitarian response, often does lit- 
tle more than provide victims a 
temporary respite. There are no 
technical solutions to political 
problems and the humanitarian 
agencies are not, by virtue of their 
own mandates, able to provide the 
political solutions. 
The impact of international assist- 
ance needs to be measured against 
the possibility of finding a more 
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